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RECENT DECISIONS
Industrial Commission, 205 Wis. 550, 238 N.W. 368 (1931). In that case the
deceased was permitted by his employer to make a special trip to bring his wife
home from a vacation visit. Incidentally he was expecting to call upon some
of his employer's customers. The court felt that the personal interest was the
primary reason for the trip. In the principal case the court refers to the Bar-
rager case as decisive in the case before it. See also Githens v. Industrial Com-
mission (Wis. 1936), 265 N.W. 662, a compensation case, and Fawcett v. Gallery
(Wis. 1936), 265 N.W. 667, a third party liability case.
THOMAS J. BERGEN.
MATERIALMEN'S LIENS-STATUTORY BONDS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCToiN.-The
plaintiff sold iron posts to the Badger Company. The latter shipped them to the
principal contractor who had entered into a contract with the state to build a
bridge. The principal contractor, unaware of plaintiff's claim, paid the Badger
Company which company later went into receivership. Dividends from that pro-
ceeding not having been declared, the plaintiff brought this action against the
principal contractor and his surety, obligors on a bond required by statute. The
trial court ordered judgment for the plaintiff, concluding it to be the duty of
the defendants to have ascertained the plaintiff's status. On appeal, held, judg-
ment reversed; a principal contractor doing public work is not liable to a sub-
contractor of a subcontractor. Subsequent liberalizing of the lien law to include
remote claimants did not extend the remedy afforded by the Public Works Act,
Gilson Bros. Co. v. Worden-A4lien Co., (Wis. 1936) 265 N.W. 217.
Until amendment the mechanic's lien law expressly denied the right of a lien
to a subcontractor of a subcontractor. See Wis. REv. STAT. (1878) § 3315. In this
exclusion was seen a recognition that building construction would be hampered
by permitting a multiplication of liens on the part of distant claimants. Dalhman
v. Clasen, 116 Wis. 113, 92 N.W. 566 (1902). The Public Works Act making
mandatory a bond to insure compensation to materialmen and laborers partici-
pating in public contract projects was enacted in 1899 as a substitute for the lien
accessible on private undertakings. See Wis. STAT. (1935) § 289.16. Its protection
is available to "parties in interest" By judicial interpretation claimants have
been restricted to the kind or nature of claims approved by the lien law. Wis-
consin Brick Co. v. Nat. Surety Co., 164 Wis. 585, 160 N.W. 1044 (1917). Most
courts have declined, in the absence of express direction, to limit such statutes
in conformity with the restrictions of lien laws, but construe them independently
to fulfill an apparent legislative purpose to secure the payment of all persons
contributing to public improvements however far removed from contractual
relationship with the principal contractor. Franzen v. Southern Surety Co., 33
Wyo. 15, 246 P. 30, 46 A.L.R. 496 (1926); Trenton v. N. J. Brick & Supply Co.,
112 N. J. Law 218, 171 At. 176 (1934); Eagle Oil Co. v. Altm n, 129 Okla. 98,
263 Pac. 666 (1928). It is the minority view that courts should not extend the
protection of the bond to remote claimants not expressly included by statute.
Miller v. Bonner, 163 La. 333, 111 So. 776 (1926) ; Paurote v. State, 111 Ind.
73, 11 N.E. 476 (1887).
In the principal case the default did not occur because of the mismanage-
ment or insolvency of the principal contractor. Timely notice would have warned
him against payment to the defaulting subcontractor until the plaintiff's claim
was secured. In Berger Mfg. Co. v. Lloyd, 209 Mo. 681, 108 S.W. 52 (1908), the
subcontractor was denied recovery on the bond because it was not shown that
he relied on the principal contractor for payment, but that he merely dealt in
the ordinary course of business upon the immediate subcontractor's credit
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Liability on the bond should not be endless. See also Miller v. State, 35 Ind. App.
379, 74 N.E. 260 (1905). The prevailing view does not recognize the distinction.
The principal contractor and the surety are liable for the materials and labor
furnished despite payment to the subcontractor and lack of notice by remote
claimants. Heine Safety Boiler Co. v. United States, 35 D.C. App. 273 (1926) ;
Oliver Constr. Co. v. Williams, 152 Ark. 414, 238 S.W. 615 (1923) ; United States
v. American Surety Co., 200 U.S. 197, 26 Sup. Ct. 168, 50 L.ed. 437 (1906). One
court sees in the recognition of an exception to recovery the danger of inviting
a collusive scheme between principal contractor and subcontractor where, through
the latter's premeditated default, both would be unjustly enriched. Portland v.
New Eng. Casualty Co., 78 Or. 195, 152 Pac. 253 (1915). In the instant case a
suggestion of collusion found by the trial court was deemed not justified by the
record. Contractor and surety may protect themselves against undisclosed claim-
ants by requiring security from the subcontractor. McCrary v. Dade County, 80
Fla. 652, 86 So. 612 (1920).
The lien law has been changed to grant the right to "every person," removing
the formerly existing barrier to recovery by a subcontractor of the second degree
under that statute. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 289.02. But the court declares that Sec-
tion 289.16 is a reference statute, a legislative device used to avoid encumbering
the statute book by constant repetition. Applying a rule of statutory construction,
the Public Works Act is said to have adopted the then limits of the lien statute
and cannot be affected by subsequent additions or modifications of the latter
statute, in the absence of express intent. It has been observed that no other
rule would furnish certainty as to whether a change in the one law would
compel a corresponding construction to the other. United States v. McMurray,
5 F. Supp. 515 (W.D. Ky. 1933). Usually adoption by reference is denied where
the reference to the statute sought to be incorporated is descriptive. Vallejo &
N. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 177 Cal. 249, 170 Pac. 426 (1918), index number;
Haas v. Lincoln Park Com'rs., 339 Ill. 491, 171 N.E. 526 (1930), specific title.
Where the reference is general it includes not only the law in force at the date
of the adopting act, but all subsequent laws on the particular subject. Lynam v.
Ramney, 195 Ky. 223, 242 S.W. 21 (1922). The language of the'public works
statute does not point to either category. A scrutiny fails to reveal the "neces-
sary implication" found by the court. Nevertheless, it is submitted that such a
determination easily leads to a transcendental inquiry in which appreciation of
the evils sought to be remedied is obscured. Disregard of traditional rules of
statutory construction where their application would defeat an apparent social
need is manifest in City of Klamath v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 146
Or. 123, 29 P. (2d) 564 (1934). See also Posselius v. First Nat. Bank, 264 Mich.
687, 251 N.W. 429 (1933). A similar realistic approach might lead to the con-
clusion that the same economic considerations which motivated the legislature
to amend the lien law to embrace claimants however far removed from the
principal contractor would impel the conferring of an equal benefit to claimants
under the statute enacted as its substitute.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case might have been sup-
ported by reason of the fact that the principal contractor was not in default.
The court went farther than was necessary and laid down an inflexible rule of
statutory construction which may bar from recovery a subcontractor of the
second degree whose only recourse is on the bond because of the insolvency or
misconduct of both principal contractor and subcontractor.
LEONARD BESSMAN.
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